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What is the Goal of Campaign Finance
Reform?
David A. Strausst
Does the current system of campaign finance need reform?
We cannot answer that question, or decide what specific reforms
might be in order, until we identify what the objective of any
reform effort should be. Is it to eliminate what amounts to legalized bribery? To dampen interest group activity? To prevent
officials from, in effect, extorting contributions? To protect elected
officials from the demands of fund-raising, so that they may devote their time to governing? To implement more fully the ideal
of one person, one vote?
Each of these justifications for reform has strong proponents,
and each has something to be said for it. But each is also, in
some respects, problematic. One reason it is so difficult to specify
the objectives of campaign-finance reform is that campaignfinance reform implicates two fundamental, and on some level
unresolvable, tensions in democratic theory. The first is the
famous question whether representatives in a democracy should
act on the basis of their own conceptions of the public interest or
should be responsive to their constituents. The second tension
results from the ineluctable fact that a democratic system of
accountability-the two-way communication between rulers and
ruled-requires resources, and those who invest more resources
on either side are, other things equal, more likely to succeed.
My claim is that most of the justifications commonly given
for campaign-finance reform do not succeed on their own terms.
This is true, for example, of the widespread concern with the
"corrupting" effects of campaign contributions, where corruption
is thought of as something akin to bribery. Many of these arguments for reform in fact reflect unease about the underlying
tensions in democratic theory-for example, concern that repre-

t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I am grateful to the
participants in the University of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium, Nov 4-5, 1994, for
their comments on an earlier version of this Article, and to Zoe Milak for research assistance. The Russell Baker Scholars Fund and the Lee and Brena Freeman Faculty Fund at
the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support.
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sentatives are too responsive to their constituents, or concern
that groups with greater access to resources have undue influence. This is not to deny that the system of campaign finance
should be reformed. But the reform program must be seen as
part of a larger agenda, not simply as a matter of "cleaning up"
campaign finance. It must be seen, for example, as part of an
effort to reduce the influence of interest groups in American
politics, or to free representatives somewhat from the pressure to
be responsive to their constituents so that they can exercise their
independent judgment better.
The one conventional justification for campaign-finance
reform that succeeds in principle is the argument that the current system of campaign finance allows too much political inequality. Apart from any other agenda, one might justify reform
on the ground that inequalities in wealth should not be translated into inequalities in political influence. But while this is true in
principle, it may be difficult in practice to justify any specific
reform measures on this ground. In particular, it may be difficult
to remedy inequality without introducing other problems. Moreover, the issue of paying for democracy reasserts itself; we have
to ask whether the gains from promoting equality are worth the
costs. It does not necessarily follow that we should be skeptical
about campaign-finance reform in general. But we should understand that in proposing reforms we are engaging certain longlasting and perhaps intractable problems that will occur in any
democratic system. We should also be clear on what the objective
of campaign-finance reform is, so that reform efforts, if they are
appropriate, do not defeat each other or dissipate their energy.
I. CORRUPTION
The Supreme Court has said that the interest in "preventing
corruption or the appearance of corruption" is "the only legitimate and compelling government interest[ ] thus far identified
for restricting campaign finances."' The claim that the current
system of campaign finance is corrupt can mean many things,
and the Court has sometimes used the term to mean something
that is hard to distinguish from inequality 2 -even though in

' Federal Election Commission v National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee,
470 US 480, 496-97 (1985).
2 See Austin v Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 659-60 (1990). This
point is made in Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 S Ct Rev 105, 109-13.
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other decisions the Court has said that remedying inequality is
not a permissible reason to limit campaign contributions or expenditures.' The most common understanding of the "corruption"
claim, however, is that campaign contributions are, in practice,
not much different from bribes. Candidates are "bought" by their
contributors and, in carrying out the duties of their office, they
respond to contributors' wishes at the expense of other constituents and the public interest.4
One obvious problem with allowing candidates to be "bought"
is that people with more wealth are, other things equal, in a
better position to buy them. Corruption of this kind, therefore,
presents problems of inequality. But "corruption" and "inequality"
are conventionally treated as different justifications for campaign-finance reform,5 and separating these two justifications
will help us identify the kind of remedy that might be needed. Inequality, if it is the problem, calls for one kind of reform; bribery,
if that is what is in fact going on, might call for a different kind
of reform. So the question is whether, apart from inequality, the
potentially "corrupting" effect of campaign contributions is a
problem.
One way to set aside any concern with inequality is to assume, as a thought experiment, that everyone has an equal opportunity to "bribe" the official or candidate of his or her choice
by making campaign contributions.6 This will isolate the problem
of corruption. For example, one might assume that the law requires campaign contributions to be made in vouchers that are
distributed according to some conception of equality.7 Or one

' See Buckley v Valeo, 424 US 1, 48-49 (1976)("[T]he concept that government may
restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."). The Court has repeated this
statement many times since. See Meyer v Grant, 486 US 414, 426 n 7 (1988); Citizens
Against Rent Control v Berkeley, 454 US 290, 295-96 (1981); FirstNatl Bank of Boston v
Bellotti, 435 US 765, 790-91 (1978).
For a leading statement of this view, see Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign
Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301 (1989). See
also Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on
Strauss and Cain, 1995 U Chi Legal F 163. The opposing view is presented in Larry J.
Sabato, Paying for Elections: The Campaign Finance Thicket 13-15 (Priority Press Publications, 1989).
' See National Conservative PoliticalAction Committee, 470 US at 496-97; Buckley,
424 US at 47-49.
' For these purposes there is no reason to distinguish campaign contributions from
independent expenditures. See, on this distinction, the discussion in Buckley, 424 US at
19-23.
See Bruce Ackerman, Crediting the Voters: A New Beginning for Campaign Finance, 13 Am Prospect 71 (Spring 1993).
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might assume a scheme that equalizes people's ability to make
contributions by multiplying contributions by a factor inversely
related to the contributor's income.8
One could argue that even in such an "equal" world, the
corrupting effects of campaign contributions will be a problem
because officials will be unduly responsive to contributors. The
claim that elected officials respond to the wishes of their contributors is certainly plausible. But the question, once inequality is
removed from the picture, is why this is troubling. Elected officials also respond to the wishes of past and potential future voters. While that may sometimes be a problem, no one thinks it is
the same kind of problem as bribery. If everyone had the same
capacity to contribute to campaigns-that is, if equality were
somehow secured (or if we decided it was not an issue)-the
difference between contributions and votes would diminish sharply.
That is because, so long as contributions are really spent on
the campaign (an important qualification I will consider shortly),
they benefit a candidate in only one way: they can be used to
gather votes. Giving a dollar is, nearly enough, like delivering to
the candidate some fraction of a vote. Of course, there is not an
exact equivalence. Among other things, votes are seldom a linear
function of dollars spent. But these differences do not make contributions more like bribes. Bribes go into the candidate's pocket.
Campaign contributions just help her win the election. On these
assumptions, an elected official's decision to please past and
future contributors is difficult to distinguish from her decision to
please those who voted for her in the past and to try to appeal to
those who might vote for her in the future.
In fact, in certain ways, a system in which representatives
respond to campaign contributions might be said to be (in theory)
more democratic than one in which representatives respond to
voters. For one thing, a system of contributions mitigates the
bundling problem.9 A voter is likely to approve of some positions
' This notion is analogous to the "district-power-equalization" proposal for school-finance reform. See generally John E. Coons, William H. Clune III, and Stephen D.
Sugarman, Private Wealth and PublicEducation 201-42 (Harvard University Press, 1970),
discussed in Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-Voter:A Constitutional Principle of
CampaignFinance, 94 Colum L Rev 1204, 1233-35 (1994).
Strictly speaking, this assumption only secures equality of financial resources, not
equality of other resources that might affect individuals' influence over political campaigns-such as education, information, leisure, celebrity, and so on. In order to separate
the effects of inequality and the effects of corruption (understood as something like
bribery), we must assume equality along those dimensions as well.
' On the bundling problem in voting for candidates, see James D. Gwartney and
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a candidate takes and disapprove of others. But the voter can
only vote in favor of or against the candidate's entire package.
Contributions can be more discriminating. A contributor can
make a legislator's reward depend precisely on the degree to
which the legislator has taken positions of which the contributor
approves, and the contributor (in a "corrupt" system) can tell the
legislator which positions will produce greater contributions. In
that way, a system of delivering contributions might better reflect popular sentiment than a system of delivering votes.
Second, contributions allow voters-that is, contributors-to
register the intensity of their views. At the ballot box, a voter has
a difficult time showing how enthusiastically she supports a
candidate. She can vote for or against, or she can abstain.'1 By
contrast, a contributor can spend her money in direct proportion
to the intensity of her views.
This line of argument does assume, in addition to equality,
that campaign contributions are really spent on the campaign
instead of being placed at the personal disposal of the candidate.
There have been some egregious violations of this principle, such
as the arrangement under which members of the United States
House of Representatives who retired by 1992 could retain any
unused campaign funds for personal purposes. 1 And no doubt
there are many more subtle violations. It will often be difficult to
draw the line between a candidate's personal well-being and the
well-being of the reelection effort, especially when the candidate
is absorbed in a campaign. In any event, a substantial portion of
a candidate's actions at any time can plausibly be said to be
related to seeking reelection.
Still, even assuming these problems can be solved, the intuition remains that there is something unseemly about candidates'
serving the desires of those who make contributions. The difference between contributions to the campaign and payments to the
candidate might seem only technical, or in any event not signifi-

Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the Conduct of Representative Government, in
James D. Gwartney and Richard E. Wagner, eds, Public Choice and Constitutional Economics 9-10 (JAI Press Inc., 1988).
1" Sometimes voting for a third party candidate may also be a way of expressing a
weak preference for one of the major candidates.
See Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance:Myths and Realities 235 n 2 (Yale
University Press, 1992).
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cant enough to bear this much weight. Bribery is a serious crime;
do we really believe that campaign contributions are so different
that they need not be restricted at all, at least not for this reason?
There are some settings in which it is plainly inappropriate
to "buy" government action, whether by campaign contributions
or in any other way. No one, for example, believes that a judge's
decision in a case, or an administrative official's quasi-judicial
decision (such as an elected attorney general deciding whether to
seek an indictment), should be responsive to payments of any
kind. Campaign contributions would be little better than bribes
in such a setting, and neither would be an acceptable way to
influence action. But by the same token, it would be unacceptable
for these decisions, at least in particular cases, to be made on the
basis of election returns. A judge, even if elected, should no more
decide a case by anticipating how the voters will react than she
should decide it on the basis of who contributes to her campaign
or who paid her a bribe. That is a bit of an overstatement; surely
it is worse to take a bribe than to be responsive to the voters,
and in adopting their general policies and approaches to classes
of cases (as opposed to the decision of specific cases), it may be
acceptable for a judge or an administrative official to respond to
the voters. But there is a core of truth to the idea that no form of
responsiveness, whether electoral or monetary, is appropriate in
such settings.
On the other hand, there are settings in which it is relatively
unproblematic for government decisions to be bought and sold,
quite literally. The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
recently auctioned off the right to use certain frequencies on the
electromagnetic spectrum. 2 That is a clear case of a government
decision being purchased. But no one believes this decision was
corrupt or improper. On the contrary, a substantial body of opinion holds that this way of making the decision is far superior to
trying to make it by reference to the public interest. 3 And no
one, so far as I am aware, thought that auctioning off frequencies
was akin to allowing officials to be bribed. It would certainly
have been objectionable if the payments had gone not into the
treasury but into the pockets of the FCC commissioners. But this
suggests that the central distinction between campaign contribu-

12 I am indebted to my colleague Professor Richard Craswell for this example.

See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J L & Econ 1, 17-24
(1959); John McMillan, Selling Spectrum Rights, 8 J Econ Perspectives 145, 146-47 (1994).
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tions and bribes-that the former, unlike the latter, do not (in
principle) enrich the candidate-may indeed be decisive. Prosaic
user fees can be seen in the same light, as payments that determine government decisions.
Why is the purchased judicial or administrative decision so
unacceptable, and the purchased telecommunications frequency
so unobjectionable? 14 One reason is that the former decision is
supposed to be made according to certain norms. This is true not
just of judges, but of prosecutors, building inspectors, police officers writing traffic tickets, and so on. At least arguably, it is also
true of government decisions about whom to hire and which contractors to engage. Those decisions are supposed to be made
according to criteria that may diverge from willingness to pay or
from electoral strength. But the decision about who should obtain
which space on the electromagnetic spectrum is different. It is
unobjectionable to have that decision made according to willingness to pay. No other norm is so obviously superior to willingness
to pay that allowing people to purchase broadcasting rights
seems a form of corruption.
On one view of the political process, most decisions made by
our system are like the decisions of judges. This view holds that
there is a comprehensive conception of the public interest. That
is, decisions in general are to be made by consulting the public
interest, and we can determine what the public interest is by
engaging in some form of normative reasoning. One might hold,
for example, a moral view that requires utility to be maximized,
or certain rights to be protected, or a certain form of equality to
be secured; and one might say, in addition, that the duty of every
elected representative is to make each decision in the way best
calculated to implement that moral vision. To the extent one
holds that view, then a political decision that was made in response to campaign contributions would be just like a judicial
decision that was made for that reason, and neither would be
much better than a decision made in response to a bribe.
The problem is that this approach also seems to leave no
room for elections. This is the first tension in democratic theory
that I mentioned at the outset. Elected representatives are supposed to respond to their constituents; otherwise, what is the
point of having elections? But they are not supposed simply to

" For general treatments of the problems of bribery and corruption, see John T.
Noonan, Jr., Bribes (Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption:
A Study in PoliticalEconomy (Academic Press, 1978).
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transmit the views of their constituents. To some degree they are
supposed to exercise independent judgment, on the model of a
judge deciding a case. To the extent that elected representatives
are supposed to implement a conception of the public interest, a
decision made in response to campaign contributions is little
better than a decision made in response to a bribe. But neither is
much different from a decision made in response to the voters'
wishes. Officials, according to this conception of the function of
government, are supposed to decide according to a moral conception, not according to what someone else-a contributor, briber,
or voter-thinks. Of course, one might say that officials are more
likely to make the right decision if they follow (to some degree)
the wishes of the voters. But once we go this far, we have to explain why they are not going to be more likely to make the right
decision if they follow the wishes of contributors.
Seen in this light, responsiveness to voters or contributors is
sometimes acceptable, sometimes unacceptable. In either event,
assuming throughout that the problem of inequality is solved,
there is no sharp line between a system in which contributions
determine officials' actions and a thoroughly "democratic" one in
which votes determine their actions.
Bribery, however, is unacceptable across the board. It must
be, then, that what makes bribery so clearly wrong is the element of unjust enrichment. The problem is not that the government responds to individuals' wishes; that is true of democracy
generally. It is not that the decisions respond to the wishes of
those who are willing to pay. Inequality aside, that will sometimes (not always) be a good thing, for roughly the same reason
it is good in ordinary markets. The FCC example shows this.
The problem is that bribes go into the officials' pockets. The
officials have converted authority given to them for public purposes into private gain. This is likely to be inefficient (since presumably the money could be put to more productive uses than
supplementing the officials' salaries), but the real problem with it
seems to have more to do with fairness. That is why the FCC
auction would seem so unacceptable if the proceeds went to the
FCC commissioners. But campaign contributions do not have this
feature. They go, not to the officials themselves, but to enhancing
the officials' reelection chances.
That is, in a regime in which campaign contributions are
freely allowed, officials' decisions are made on the basis of what
will most enhance their chance of reelection. That is crucially
different from a regime of bribery. Whether it is a good thing
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depends on how we resolve the question about the extent to
which representatives should be responsive or should exercise
independent judgment, the question of democratic theory that I
mentioned at the outset.
From what I have said so far, it follows that, to the extent
reformers are concerned about bribery-like corruption, the proper
reforms are, in principle, relatively modest. One might want to
ensure that contributions were made public, which could have
the democracy-enhancing result of letting voters know to whom a
candidate was beholden. One might want to limit contributions
by persons who are not a candidate's constituents (although it is
not obvious that a representative should be responsive only to
her particular constituents and not to some larger national constituency). Finally, one might want more rigorous auditing and
accounting procedures to be sure that candidates and their staffs
spend campaign contributions on the campaign. But it is certainly not obvious that the concern with corruption, taken alone,
justifies public financing, or restrictions on contributions, or any
of the other relatively dramatic measures that some commentators have proposed.
II.

INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS

Much of the concern about the corrupting effect of campaign
contributions may be directed at the dangers of excessive interest-group power. The widely held view that political action committees ("PACs") are evil, for example, suggests that this is the
core concern about "corruption."15 Relatively small groups whose
members are intensely interested in an issue have an organizational advantage over much larger groups whose members have a
smaller interest. This organizational advantage can translate
into an advantage in democratic politics. This is a basic insight of
public-choice theory.1" The problem of excessive interest-group
power is a different problem from bribery; interest groups can exert disproportionate power even in a system in which there are
no campaign contributions at all, only voting. But it seems rea" For this view of PACs, see Fred Wertheimer and Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign
Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 Colum L Rev 1126,
1128-31, 1136-40, 1154-56 (1994). But see Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance:
Myths and Realities 23-28, 164-74 (Yale University Press, 1992)(describing and criticizing
this view)(cited in note 11).
"6 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups 127-29 (Harvard University Press, 2d ed 1971); Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice
If 308-10 (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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sonable to suppose that a system of unrestricted private financing of campaigns heightens the advantage that interest groups
have, for several reasons.
To begin with, contributions can be put directly under the
control of interest groups. While interest groups also promise to
deliver votes, they deliver them much less efficiently and reliably, because of the secret ballot and because individuals must
cast their own votes. More subtly, voting at the ballot box rather
than through contributions may encourage voters to concern
themselves with the public interest, or at least with a range of
issues, rather than with their more narrow group interests. That
is partly because of the bundling effect: a voter is forced to express approval or disapproval of a candidate's entire record, while
a contributor has the opportunity to limit her approval or disapproval to specific actions.
Finally, a voter looking for an intermediary group to channel
her contribution-that is, a PAC-may be hard pressed to find a
"public-interest" PAC precisely because small groups of intensely
interested members are more likely to be organized. There are
many reasons for a contributor to want to take advantage of an
intermediary like a PAC. For example, they have more knowledge and a greater capacity to monitor an elected official's performance, so they are likely to spend her contributions more effectively.17 But a contributor who wishes to use a PAC for these
purposes may have to choose among various groups that represent narrow interests.
It is certainly not out of the question that the current system
of campaign finance has increased the influence of narrowly
interested groups. Is that a reason for reform? The question raises many complex issues, and of course it points to another of the
great, and so far unresolved, tensions in democratic theory and
practice. Nearly everyone agrees that some narrowly focused
interest groups do good things, by registering the intensity of
voters' preferences and by forcing officials to pay attention to the
legitimate grievances of groups the officials might otherwise ignore. But most people also agree that interest groups are sometimes not healthy, because they can bring about results that are
inconsistent with the public interest. People differ, of course, over

See David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase 75-76 (The
Brookings Institution, 1990).
17
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which interest groups are good and which are pernicious. For
some, the villains are the gun lobby and the sugar lobby; for
others, they might be civil-rights and environmental-protection
groups.
It might well be that interest groups should be weakened
across the board, because the harm they do outweighs the good.
Campaign-finance reform-the public financing of campaigns, for
example-seems a plausible step toward this objective. There is,
of course, the question whether we can rely on a political process
that is, by hypothesis, too subject to interest-group pressures to
produce such a reform, as opposed to a reform that masquerades
as something that reduces interest-group influence but actually
favors certain groups over others. But even if that practical obstacle could be overcome, it would not be obvious that the objective-weakening interest groups across the board-is a good one.
If special-interest groups are weakened, there might just be more
opportunities for pandering and demagogy. Single-issue voting
would not go away even if single-issue contributions did. The
weakening of intermediate organizations that aggregate people's
views might lead to a less well-informed electorate. It might also
lead to an increased degree of alienation from politics."i In any
event, these are the questions that a reform agenda would have
to address.
Alternatively, the point might be not to weaken interestgroup influence generally, but to weaken only bad interest
groups, not good ones. But then changes in campaign-finance
laws become a way that the combatants over various substantive
issues-gun control, tax reform, environmental protection,
etc.--can try to advance their positions. On this approach, there
is no independent agenda of reforming campaign-finance laws in
order to improve the system of democratic accountability generally. It may well be correct to think about campaign-finance reform
as a way to undermine, not interest groups generally, but only
unworthy interest groups. But this is a different kind of agenda
from what the advocates of campaign-finance reform usually
describe.
In short, interest-group influence may be a worthy target of
campaign-finance reform, but the matter is much more complex
than it might appear to be at first. Interest-group activity in a
On the general question of the role of intermediary groups, see the discussion in
Robert D. Putnam with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti, Making Democracy
Work: Civic Traditionsin Modern Italy (Princeton University Press, 1993).
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democracy can have valuable, as well as harmful, effects. It is
possible that reducing interest-group pressure across the board
would be a good idea; but it is not obvious that this is so. And if
the goal of campaign-finance reform is selectively to reduce the
power of some interest groups, then campaign-finance reform is
no longer an independent project, justified on "good government"
grounds, but rather part of a different, more partisan agenda
that has to be justified on its own terms.
III. EXTORTION
The problem of extortion has received surprisingly little
attention in the public debate over campaign-finance reform. 9
As a conceptual matter, it is the opposite of the concern with
corruption (understood as a form of bribery): the problem is not
the power that contributors have over officials, but the power
that officials have over potential contributors. Elected officials
might extract contributions from individuals and groups who
have no desire to contribute but fear that the official will take
actions unfavorable to them if they do not.
It is surprisingly common, for example, for certain groups to
contribute to both competing candidates in an election campaign. 2° Some reformers point to practices like this as evidence
that the contributors are trying to buy influence with the official,
and do not much care who is elected.2 1 But that account does
not seem right. Why would any official be "bought" under these
circumstances, since she knows the contributor helped her opponent as well, and presumably will help her opponent in the future no matter what she does? Similarly, in the last decade or so
there has been a dramatic increase in contributions to incumbents with safe seats.2" This, too, is sometimes cited as a sign of
efforts to buy influence.2 3 But to the extent that the incumbent's

" See, however, the discussion in Frank J. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths
and Realities 60-97 (Yale University Press, 1992)(cited in note 11).
"' See Ken Auletta, Annals of Communications: Pay Per Views, The New Yorker 52
(June 5, 1995).
21 See Kay Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 241-42 (Harper & Row, 1986); Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign
Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is Deeply Rooted, 18 Hofstra L Rev 301, 308-12
(1989)(cited in note 4).
2 See Sorauf, Inside CampaignFinance at 67-68, 70-71 (cited in note 11). See generally, on the advantages of incumbency, Jamin Raskin and John Bonifaz, The Constitutional Imperative and PracticalSuperiority of Democratically FinancedElections, 94 Colum L
Rev 1160, 1176-77 (1994).
23 Michael W. McConnell, Redefine Campaign Finance 'Reform', Chi Trib 1-15 (June
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seat is truly safe, it is again unclear why she would care about
appeasing her contributors, at least very much.
In both of these cases, the more likely explanation is that the
victim is not the public trust, supposedly betrayed by a "bribed"
official, but the contributor. It is more likely that the contributor
felt compelled to make a contribution for fear that, if she did not
(and especially if a competitor did), the official would retaliate.
The same may be true when groups whose interests are often in
conflict contribute to the same side in a campaign (environmental
groups and manufacturers' trade associations, for example, or
plaintiffs' lawyers and the insurance industry, or railroads and
the trucking industry).
An official who explicitly extorted funds in this way would, of
course, be committing a crime. But there are many ways that an
official could subtly signal her intentions and extract the contributions without being overt. In fact, the official might make no
threat at all. Even if the official has no intention of doing anything against the public interest as she understands it, groups
likely to be affected by her decisions may fear that they run too
great a risk that she will hold it against them if they do not
contribute to her campaign.
Oddly, even an official who is quite consciously engaged in
extortion will, to the extent she succeeds, often have little reason
not to go ahead and do what she thinks is right. If her extortion
is successful, after all, she will not have to punish anyone. Her
decisions may be distorted by the need to give the impression, in
general or to some specific group, that she is prepared to retaliate if support is not forthcoming in the future. But as I said,
many contributors may feel coerced to contribute even though the
official had no bad intentions at all.
Whatever the effects of extortion on the decisions made by
officials, extortion of this kind does operate to impose a kind of
tax. It is an involuntary exaction from certain members of the
public. One might say that, to the extent this kind of extortion is
going on, we already have a form of public financing of cam-

29, 1993).
24 For an argument to the effect that extortion of this kind is always a danger in the

absence of strict limits on legislative authority, see Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction
and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J Legal Stud 101 (1987).
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paigns. Instead of the money being raised through the official tax
system, it is the result of "shakedowns." That is, these "taxes" are
assessed arbitrarily, on those groups that are most vulnerable to
the officials involved.
This kind of extortion is therefore unfair in an important
sense: groups are singled out for an exaction without a democratic vote or any other legitimate reason. Also, these "taxes" are
probably inefficient, in the sense that industries subject to extortion will have higher costs, relative to other industries, than they
would in a well-functioning market. So here, too, there is a potential agenda for campaign-finance reform, but it is a different
agenda from the one usually advanced. The objective is not so
much to protect the health of the system of government as to
protect potential contributors against unfair and inefficient exactions.
In this connection, it is important to note that "corrupting"
contributions and "extorted" contributions are not two distinct
categories.2 5 The same transaction might be both. Indeed, corrupt public officials who have sold their offices for bribes are
often convicted under statutes forbidding extortion." The same
bribe, or campaign contribution, might both influence an official
to do something she would not otherwise do (the potentially "corrupting" effect) and be extorted in the sense that the donor pays
it only because he feels he has to in order to avoid retaliation.
The value of the distinction is not that it sorts two categories
of contributions, but that it identifies two different effects with
which we might be concerned: the "corrupting" effect of diverting
a public official from the pursuit of the public interest, and the
inefficiency and unfairness of extortion. These different problems
call for different kinds of reforms, and raise different questions
about what must be shown before we decide that reform is worthwhile. "Corruption," I have argued, really reduces to a concern
either with interest-group pressure or with excessive responsiveness by representatives to members of the public. Extortion is a
concern with inefficiency and unfairness to potential contributors.
It is hard to know how prevalent the extortion of campaign
contributions is; obviously, if it is not especially prevalent the

' The argument in this paragraph is a response to a point pressed by Daniel Hays
Lowenstein at the Legal Forum Symposium, Nov 4-5, 1994. See also Daniel Hays
Lowenstein, Campaign Contributions and Corruption: Comments on Strauss and Cain,
1995 U Chi Legal F 163, 182-85 (cited in note 4).
26 See, for example, Evans v United States, 504 US 255 (1992)(upholding elected
official's conviction of extortion under the Hobbs Act, 18 USC § 1951(bX2) (1988)).
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case for reform on this ground is weakened. One indication that
it is not prevalent is the absence of agreements, among potential
competing contributors, not to contribute or to limit contributions. That is how the extorted contributors could defend themselves. In effect, it would be a cartel in the buyers' market for
political favors, designed to drive down the price that politicians
could exact. Since there is an elaborate reporting regime for contributions, it would be relatively easy to police cheating in the
cartel. Were extortion widespread one would expect to see at
least some degree of activity of this kind. Perhaps the problem is
just that most groups have shifting patterns of conflict and alliance, making it difficult to organize or even identify all the parties needed to make an agreement stick.
Also, if extortion were prevalent, one would expect to see
calls for campaign-finance reform from the interest groups that
supposedly are the victims of this extortion. But in this country,
at least, those groups do not seem to be strong promoters of campaign-finance reform. The evidence of contributions to representatives with safe seats, and contributions by opposing interest
groups, does suggest that this problem may be a substantial one.
If this is so, however, the reform agenda will have a different
objective from the anticorruption ideal that is usually advanced.
In sum, the extortion of campaign contributions-the exploitation of contributors by candidates-is a legitimate concern for
campaign-finance reform. Extortion would be troubling for reasons of both fairness and efficiency. Unlike "corruption," extortion
does not reduce to something else, such as a concern with inequality or interest-group influence. It is unclear how prevalent a
problem the extortion of campaign contributions is; in any event,
the need to prevent extortion does not seem to be prominent
among the reasons advanced by reformers.
IV. THE BURDEN ON CANDIDATES

Recently, complaints about having to raise campaign funds
have become more common, or at least more public, among public
officials and candidates for office. 7 Candidates find fund-raising
to be time-consuming and demeaning. The demands of fund-raising are also said to hurt the public by diverting the time and en-

27 See David B. Magleby and Candice J. Nelson, The Money Chase 43-45 (The
Brookings Institution, 1990)(cited in note 17); Peter Linstrom, Congress Speaks: A Survey
of the 100th Congress 80, 81-82, 91 (Center for Responsive Politics, 1988).
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ergy officials need to do their jobs well and, partly as a result, by
driving many able people from public service.2"
This justification for campaign-finance reform is, again, undeniably substantial. But when analyzed, this argument seems to
fall into the same pattern as the arguments for reform based on
corruption and interest-group domination. Part of the problem is
inequality. When inequality is factored out, the problem does not
disappear, but it resolves into one of the dilemmas I mentioned
at the outset. The case for reform rests on a judgment about
whether it is more important for an official to stay in touch with
her constituents or to spend time on governing. Moreover, any
argument for reform will have to identify another way to raise
money to finance political activity.
Inequality seems to constitute part of the reason that fundraising is perceived as demeaning and vaguely sordid. The image
that prevails is of a candidate courting "fat cat" contributors
while neglecting ordinary citizens. If everyone had roughly the
same capacity to make a contribution to a campaign-if, for example, there were a voucher scheme-seeking contributions
might look more like campaigning for votes. A candidate who
declared that she did not want to run for office because she did
not want to raise money would be like a candidate who said she
did not want to undertake the rigors of campaigning. Few would
deny that some good candidates are lost for that reason, but the
situation would not be seen as a crisis warranting major reforms.
Even under this contribution-equalizing voucher scheme,
there still might be potential contributors, such as intermediary
organizations, who would have access to large sums of money
and whom candidates would especially need to court. This need
not be a sordid process. Charitable organizations, arts groups,
hospitals, universities, and other private entities systematically
raise funds from people and organizations, such as foundations,
who think their mission is worthwhile. It is possible, but it is not
obvious, that public funding of such private institutions would be
an improvement. Trying to raise money is one way in which the
leadership of organizations is forced to keep in touch with constituencies that have a legitimate interest in how the organizations are run. Thus, for example, if public funding excused a

See generally, Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and the Widening Gyre of Fund-Raising:
Why Campaign Spending Limits May Not Violate the First Amendment After All, 94
Colum L Rev 1281 (1994); David Price, The CongressionalExperience: A View from the
Hill 26-29 (Westview Press, 1992).
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university president from the need to raise money, the effect
would reduce the influence of the alumni, even if, say, the alumni
continued to vote for the members of the governing body of the
university.
To put the point another way, public financing of elections is
in a sense antidemocratic precisely because it relieves candidates
of the need to seek an important source of support from constituents. Explaining why one is worth a contribution is arguably part
of the job of democratic politics. The German Constitutional
Court concluded that unrestricted public subsidies of political
parties are unconstitutional partly for this reason: "The parties
must remain dependent upon citizen approval and support not
only politically but economically and organizationally as well.
Public funds thus may not be permitted to liberate individual
parties from the risk of failure of their efforts to obtain sufficient
support from the voters."29
The possible concerns about "excessive" fund-raising activities by candidates thus identify the same fault lines in democratic theory that I mentioned at the outset. Representatives may be
too concerned about responding to constituents and insufficiently
concerned with the business of governing. In this context, that
means that they may spend too much time persuading constituents to give them money-just as it is sometimes said that elected officials spend too much of their time on positioning themselves for the next election. But it is difficult to specify just what
proportion of their time representatives should spend on each of
these tasks, even in an ideal world.
Having said that, there is no reason to think that candidates
currently spend the right amount of time on fund-raising, or for
that matter on campaigning, or that they would if inequality
were taken out of the picture. The amount of time and energy
candidates must spend on fund-raising depends on (perhaps
among other things) people's willingness to contribute and the
amount that must be raised. People's willingness to give to political campaigns (or universities or museums) is a function of many
things; the cost of campaigns is a separate function of many
other things. It will only be coincidence if candidates spend the
right amount of time on fund-raising, and there is no reason to
think that they do under the current system. But advocates of
reform proposals must sort out these various aspects of the prob-

- 85 BVerfGE 264, 287 (1992), as quoted in David P. Currie, The Constitution of the
FederalRepublic of Germany 211 n 155 (The University of Chicago Press, 1994).
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lem; they must decide whether their principal concern is inequality and, if it is not, they must justify the position that representatives spend too little time governing and too much time explaining themselves to members of the public who might give
them money. Reform proposals cannot be presented as straightforward ways of eliminating an unquestionably undesirable aspect of the system.
One other point should be noted. It is possible that the emphasis on fund-raising has contributed to the bureaucratization
of government. Fund-raising, like campaigning for votes, is not
completely unconnected to governing; but it does mean that the
candidate or official must concentrate on articulating broad
themes and can address details only when they affect a particular target audience. This relationship among an elected official,
her staff, and the process of governing-the official articulates
broad themes, deals with details when potentially controversial,
but otherwise leaves most of the work to the staff-may or may
not be desirable. If it is not, there is an additional reason for
campaign-finance reform. But once again, it is difficult to get a
fix on just how serious these concerns are. And the justifications
for reform appear in a different light from that in which they are
often presented.
V. EQUALITY
The promotion of equality-a basis for limiting campaign
contributions and expenditures that the Supreme Court has ruled
out explicitly (although sometimes permitting implicitly)'-is
the one basis for reform that seems easiest to justify, at least in
principle. As many have argued, the principle of one person, one
vote has direct application to campaign finance."' People who
contribute more to campaigns have, in general, more influence
over the outcome. If it would be wrong to give more votes to people with more money, then there is a prima facie argument that
it is wrong to allow people who have more money to exert greater
influence through contributions. 2

3o See notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
"
See Edward B. Foley, Equal Dollars-Per-Voter:A ConstitutionalPrincipleof Campaign Finance,94 Colum L Rev 1204, 1212-13, 1225-26 (1994)(cited in note 8); David Cole,
First Amendment Antitrust: The End of Laissez-Fairein Campaign Finance, 9 Yale L &
Policy Rev 236, 243-44, 247-48 (1991). See also J. Skelly Wright, Money and the Pollution
of Politics:Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 Colum L Rev
609, 616-20 (1982).
32 See Foley, 94 Colum L Rev at 1220-26 (cited in note 8); Cole, 9 Yale L & Policy Rev
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The problem with equality as a goal of campaign-finance
reform comes at the level of practice, and it occurs in at least two
forms. First, can the political system be trusted to reform campaign finance for the ostensible reason of promoting equality--or
will such reforms just be a cover for incumbent protection and
other bad things? Second, even if the political system can be
trusted in this respect, is promoting equality worth the costs?
Incumbent protection and related problems have been thoroughly canvassed in the literature on campaign-finance reform.33 Incumbents share an interest in protecting incumbents,
and that interest may outweigh party loyalty or ideological concerns. The one-person, one-vote analogy suggests that there is a
dark side of campaign-finance reform: it may be an equivalent to
gerrymandering, which, according to most accounts, has been
widely used to protect incumbents. Within the limits specified by
the principle of one person, one vote, legislatures have ample
room to draw district lines to protect those whom they want to
protect. The same may be true within a principle of equality in
campaign finance.
Of course, the risks of incumbent protection or other distortions may be worth taking, if the harms of inequality are great
enough. In addition, as long as some regulation of campaign
finance is permitted, there is a danger that legislatures will
abuse the power. It is not clear that allowing regulation for the
purpose of promoting equality is especially likely to increase the
dangers.
There is also simply the question of costs, both monetary
costs and what might be called moral costs. The moral costs are
incurred because it is arguable (although far from clear) that
restricting people's ability to spend what they want to on campaigns infringes their autonomy in a significant way. The monetary costs result from replacing a system of essentially voluntary
financing with one of compulsory financing.3 4 As things stand
now, we have a system in which political campaigns, a very important but very expensive activity, are voluntarily funded. At
least this is true if we leave aside the problem of extorted contri-

at 243-44, 247-48 (cited in note 31). I make the argument at greater length in David A.
Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 Colum L Rev 1369,
1382-85 (1994).
See Lillian R. BeVier, CampaignFinance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 Colum L Rev 1258, 1279 (1994).
' See Bruce E. Cain, Moralism and Realism in Campaign Finance Reform, 1995 U
Chi Legal F 111, 128.
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butions. Any system that equalizes the ability to influence campaign finance will, unavoidably, require the expenditure of public
funds. That is because it will diminish the ability of people who
are now financing campaigns to influence the outcome. If their
dollars cannot produce as much influence, they will not be willing
to pay .as much. Since campaigns are so expensive, the public
expenditures may end up being very great.
Determining whether these expenditures are worth it will be
a dauntingly complex task. Several things must be considered.
First, to the extent campaign contributions are extorted today,
public financing may be an improvement, from the point of view
of both fairness and efficiency. Also, of course, if public financing
can reduce some wasteful government expenditures, for example,
by diminishing the power of interest groups that bring about
wasteful expenditures, it could, in theory, pay for itself.
On the other hand, new government expenditures may be
financed, not from taxes or by reducing other, unnecessary, expenditures, but by reducing the amount spent on those who are
politically most defenseless. In addition, it is not clear how much
true equality can be obtained by regulation. People or groups
with great wealth at their disposal may find other ways, apart
from contributions or expenditures, to influence candidates, such
as offering them advantageous investments or opportunities for
financial gain after the official leaves office. It will be very difficult to police all of these avenues of potential influence.
Finally, there is the question of just how harmful inequality
is, when separated from the problem of, for example, interestgroup pressure. It is conceivable that wealthy individuals, as it
were, cancel each other out: that each side in a partisan contest
will have wealthy patrons who support it. To the extent that this
is true, the distorting effects of inequality may be limited. Precluding the private use of wealth will only eliminate a large
source of voluntary funding, with no offsetting gain. Of course it
is also possible that the influence of inequalities of wealth is not
so benign. It may distort political outcomes in important ways.
The point is just that a persuasive case for reform will have to
give an account of what the distorting effects of wealth are,
whether we can (given the possibilities of evasion and in-kind
benefits) overcome those effects, and whether the costs of doing
so are worth it.
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CONCLUSION

The conventional justifications for campaign-finance reform
raise issues that are more complex and problematic than they
might appear to be at first. The one justification that stands up
well as a matter of principle is, ironically, the one that the Supreme Court has criticized most directly-the interest in promoting equality. The other justifications do not lack substance, but
they conceal deeper issues that implicate important tensions in
democratic theory and practice. In particular, the other justifications, such as concerns with corruption and with the misuse of
candidates' time, raise basic questions about the extent to which
representatives in a democratic government should be responsive
to their constituents, and about the appropriate level of interestgroup influence in democratic politics.
Does this mean we should be skeptical of all proposals for
reforming campaign finance? Not necessarily; in fact, perhaps
just the opposite. These arguments suggest that campaign-finance reform cannot be justified on the basis of relatively neutral
or technical arguments about democratic government. Instead,
any ambitious reform agenda will engage highly controversial
and politically charged issues. This may, however, make the
question of campaign-finance reform more, not less, urgent.
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